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In this paper we present a model of °exicurity capitalism that exhibits a second labor
market with the government as an employer of ¯rst resort, where all workers not employed
by ¯rms in the private sector ¯nd meaningful employment. We show that the model exhibits
a unique interior steady state which is asymptotically stable under real wage adjustment
dynamics of the type considered in Blanchard and Katz (1999), and under a type of Okun's
Law that links the level of utilization of ¯rms to their hiring and ¯ring decision. The
introduction of a company pension fund can be shown to contribute to the viability of the
analyzed economic system. However, when credit is incorporated in the model, in place
of savings-driven supply side °uctuations in economic activity, investment-driven demand
side business cycle °uctuations (of a probably much more volatile type) can take place.
|||||||
Keywords: Flexicurity, employer of ¯rst resort, Solovian growth, company pension funds,
sustainability.
JEL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM: E3, E6, H1
¤Corresponding author. E-mail: p°aschelwiwi.uni-bielefeld.de1
1 Introduction
In the US unemployment rates had been relatively low until the beginning of the ¯nancial crisis
in the late 2000's, in contrast to Europe where a great many countries have been su®ering from
high and persistent unemployment over the last decades. But there are also European countries
that were successful in maintaining high employment rates. These are, on the one hand, the
Netherlands and the Nordic Welfare states, such as Denmark, Finland and Sweden, and, on
the other hand, Great Britain and Ireland. While Great Britain and Ireland have pursued an
Anglo-Saxon approach with respect to its economic policy, mainly characterized by °exible
hiring and ¯ring conditions and by few social spending, the Nordic Welfare states and the
Netherlands have followed a di®erent policy. The latter allow °exible hiring and ¯ring, too,
but they have adopted high standards of social security. Thus, these countries demonstrate that
°exibility and security need not be contradictory but may well be compatible and that social
security does not necessarily lead to high unemployment rates or instability of the economic
system. Often, the Nordic welfare system is referred to as the °exicurity model, with the term
°exicurity obtained by merging the terms °exibility and security.
It is in particular in public debates, that the °exicurity model has attracted great attention,
although there is no clear consensus on its de¯nition (cf. Zhou (2007). According to Wilthagen
(1998) the concept of °exicurity was launched by the sociologist and member of the Dutch
Scienti¯c Council for Government Policy Hans Adriaansens in speeches and interviews. Ac-
cording to Adriaansens °exicurity means a shift from 'security within a job' toward 'security
of a job' (cf. Wilthagen, 1998, p. 13). In any case, an important aspect as regards °exibility
on the labor market is that there is both external °exibility, i.e. hiring and ¯ring, as well as
internal °exibility, such as °exible working hours and the possibility of working overtime and
part-time work (see Wilthagen et al., 2004a,b). Essential characteristics with respect to secu-
rity are income security that is income protection in the event of job loss and after retiring from
work, on the one hand, and the ability to combine paid work with other social responsibilities
and obligations, on the other hand. Our goal in this paper is to integrate some ideas of the
°exicurity model into the basic neoclassical growth model as presented by Solow (1956) and
to analyze the resulting model with respect to its dynamic properties.
Solow's (1956) model of economic growth provides the basis for a variety of subsequent models
analyzing the phenomenon of economic growth in Western capitalist economies. An important
aspect in Solow's growth model is the assumption of a neoclassical production function with
smooth factor substitution characterizing the input-output relationship that determines the
laws of motion of the economy, in place of a ¯xed proportions technology. Solow assumed full
employment and considered homogenous labor as one of the factors of production. In contrast
to that, Goodwin's (1967) growth cycle model had quite a di®erent starting point (Marx's
reserve army mechanism): It assumed { as in Marx (1954, ch. 23) { a real wage Phillips
curve and considered its interaction assuming an extreme variant of classical savings behavior
in a technological framework with ¯xed proportions in production. Instead of monotonic
convergence to the steady state, the Goodwin model gave rise to persistent cycles around
its steady state position of a structurally unstable center dynamics type that could be easily2
modi¯ed towards the occurrence of stable limit cycles (as in Rose's (1967) employment cycle
model).1
It is not di±cult to combine the Solow growth model with the Goodwin growth cycle model,
since the latter only introduces real wage rigidities into the Solovian framework (or smooth
factor substitution into the Goodwin growth model). The resulting model features damped
oscillations (close to Goodwinian cycles if the elasticity of substitution between capital and
labor is low) and even monotonic convergence of the state variables (labor intensity and real
wage) to the steady state in the opposite case. However, one problem of this integrated model
is { if it creates periods of mass unemployment { that it implies the possibility of unemployed
workers losing their skills and, thus, leading to labor market segmentation, with older workers
subject to long-term or never ending unemployment and workers' families becoming degraded
in their social and emotional status (a situation that is di±cult to reverse). Further, there
may be counteracting unemployment bene¯ts, low wages for the degraded part of the work
force and more that must be analyzed with respect to their consequences for the evolution of
capitalist economies.
In this paper we will not engage into such an analysis of the consequences of mass unemploy-
ment but we will augment the above Solow-Goodwin synthesis by an employer of ¯rst (not
last) resort, where all workers (and even pensioners) ¯nd reasonable employment if they are
temporarily dismissed from the private sector of the economy, the sector of capitalist ¯rms. In
our model economy, that is to be seen as ideal in that respect, we only allow for two types of
skill characteristics: skilled and high-skilled labor instructed in primary/secondary education
and in tertiary education, respectively. Thus, by speaking of an employer of ¯rst resort we
intend to underline that the skilled or high-skilled work pro¯les are employed in the public
sector as well as in the private sector. Hence, we abstract from an employer of last resort and
from the corresponding labor market where all labor is employed that is either unwilling or
unable to work as skilled or high-skilled worker. By modeling the government as an employer
of ¯rst resort we want to emphasize that the government needs quali¯ed employees in order to
organize the complex social security system in a °exicurity economy. This fact holds true for
industrialized countries and, therefore, for Nordic countries as well so that one cannot call the
government an employer of last resort. The model we build on this basis is providing a stylized
theoretical basis for the Nordic Welfare approach to °exicurity, but one that is not subject
to the pejorative reformulation of °exicurity as '°exploitation' as it is sometimes referred to
in evaluations of the concept of °exicurity in the political debate. Instead, we use the Solow
model with the Goodwin real wage rigidity to construct full employment in this framework by
means of (decentralized) government actions, with wage bargaining in the private sector and
with two implied laws of motion (for employment and for the real wage) that will guarantee
even monotonic convergence to the steady state in such a framework with °exible hiring and
¯ring.
We view this model as an ideal economic system, a democratic and egalitarian society should
aspire to, and towards which progress paths have to be found, con¯rmed by elections in a
1See also Solow (1990) for an interesting discussion of the Goodwin (1967) growth cycle model.3
democratic society introducing ratchet e®ects when some parties propose to abolish such an
evolution (if it has been by and large successful). It is ideal in that it combines °exible hiring
and ¯ring (and job discontinuities in the ¯rst, the private labor market) with income and
employment security through a pension scheme and a second labor market that preserves the
skills of the workforce and prevents their human degradation. Although being an ideal system
some elements have already been integrated in real-world economies. For example, in Europe
the three main pillars on which the social security system rests are the health care system, the
unemployment insurance and the pension system. In our model we will take into account two
of these pillars, the unemployment insurance and the pension system while neglecting health
insurance. Thus, we present a model where the aspect of income security is modeled with
respect to unemployment and with respect to the old age. By demonstrating that our model
economy is stable, meaning that it converges to a steady state, we can show that an economy
with a relatively elaborate social security system may well be a sustainable one.
We think that modern market economies are currently experiencing progress paths towards the
°exicurity model, sometimes on a very low pace as the current discussion about minimum wages
in Germany demonstrates. Yet, even such a discussion can be re°ected from the perspective
of the concept of °exicurity and may be interpreted as a step forward towards °exicurity
if a general minimum level of (real) wages can be established in Germany. We have shown
in Flaschel and Greiner (2009) in the context of Goodwin's growth cycle mechanism that
minimum and also maximum wages (of workers) could dampen the employment °uctuations
of the economy and could thus contribute to its stability after a transitory period of low
employment.
Flexicurity { properly understood { may be the modern equivalent to Solow's growth model
and may { in the same ideal way { provide a perspective for the future of capitalism which
is compatible with the social structure of democratic societies. To demonstrate the working
of °exicurity capitalism we will provide in section 2 the accounting framework for such an
economy. In section 3 we will consider the behavior of the agents in such a framework in very
basic terms and show on this basis the global asymptotic stability of { and even monotonic
convergence to { its steady state position with respect to its central state variables, the real
wage in the ¯rst labor market and the utilization rate of the workforce of ¯rms. In section
4 we study the law of motion and the steady state positions of the (extra) company pension
payments this model type allows for and, thus, consider conditions for the viability of the
economy (which should allow for pension payments above the level of base pension payments).
Yet, if we consider credit ¯nancing in nominal terms the investment behavior can depart
from savings behavior such that the coordination of these two magnitudes leads to Keynesian
e®ective demand problems giving rise to demand driven business cycles. This is the stage
where °exicurity capitalism must prove its superiority, since there are existing business cycle
°uctuations of a much larger extent than those that can originate from supply side driven full
capacity growth. Such problems must however be left for future research here.4
2 Flexicurity societies
The °exicurity concept { primarily discussed with respect to the Nordic economies and the
Netherlands { intends to combine two labor market components which { as many economists
might argue { cannot be reconciled with each other, namely workplace °exibility in a very
competitive environment with income and employment (but not job) security for workers in
this economy. The problem here is to ¯nd the appropriate mix between the two aspects of
labor market institutions, intended to overcome both the case of °exibility without security
(free hiring and ¯ring capitalism) as well as the case of security without °exibility (past Eastern
socialism).
In this section we ¯rst consider some basic features of a °exicurity economy. Thereafter, the
budget equations and the economic behavior within these equations are presented. On this
basis we investigate the stability of balanced growth paths of such an economy and also its
sustainability concerning the generation of su±cient income and pension payments.
2.1 Full-employment capitalism: Ideal, status-quo and compromises
Let us start here from a de¯nition of the concept of °exicurity as it is discussed in the European
Union.
The concept of '°exicurity' attempts to ¯nd a balance between °exibility for employers (and
employees) and security for employees. The Commission's 1997 Green Paper on 'Partner-
ship for a new organization of work' stressed the importance of both °exibility and security
to competitiveness and the modernization of work organization. The idea also features
prominently in the 'adaptability pillar' of the EU employment guidelines, where 'the so-
cial partners are invited to negotiate at all appropriate levels agreements to modernize the
organization of work, including °exible working arrangements, with the aim of making un-
dertakings productive and competitive and achieving the required balance between °exibility
and security.' This 'balance' is also consistently referred to in the Commission's Social
Policy Agenda 2000-2005 COM (2000) 379 ¯nal, Brussels, 28 June 2000).2
The concept of `°exicurity' was introduced in Denmark on the political level by the social
democratic prime minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen in the 1990's3 and it was introduced into the
academic literature by Ton Wilthagen, see Wilthagen (1998) and Wilthagen et al. (2004a,b)
on the Dutch origins of the °exicurity model. The role of the °exicurity approach in the
performance of the Danish economy is critically investigated in Anderson and Svarer (2007);
for further critical assessments of the proposals for and the discussion on a °exicurity economy
the reader is moreover referred to recent contributions by Funk (2008) and Viebrock and J.
Clasen (2009).
We stress in this context that our following approach to °exicurity is an abstract and primarily
macroeconomic one that neglects the di±culties of how to implement °exicurity coordination





Our approach to labor market institutions of the °exicurity type di®ers signi¯cantly from the
basic income guarantee (BIG) and Employer of Last Resort (ELR) approaches of the literature
as they are compared for example in Tcherneva and Wray (2005), though the intention of
these and our approaches have many things in common. Our approach can be characterized
as an abstract modeling of a full-employment economy comparable in intention to the Tableau
Economique of Quesnay. It therefore represents an ideal economy to be compared with the
status-quo of actual developed capitalist economies. Such a comparison should then allow us
to formulate compromises between the ideal and the status-quo of actual economies, like the
United States of America or Australia, as described in Tchernova and Wray in the ¯rst case
and in Quirk et al. (2006) with respect to Job Guarantee (JG) principles in the second case.
We would however argue here that these latter approaches are presenting compromises without
really formulating an ideal on the basis of which these compromises can be designed.
We thus just do the opposite here which may therefore be considered as complementary to
the ELR and JG approaches, though we do not assume job guarantees, but only employment
security. Moreover, however, in the ideal we have dismissed the concept of un- or low-skilled
labor as representing a signi¯cant portion of the working population, since we believe that an
ideal schooling system can overcome this factual situation to a large degree.
2.2 Flexicurity: Basic principles and problems
Basic aspects and problems of such a combination are:
² How much °exibility in:
1.1 hiring and ¯ring and job discontinuities?
1.2 wage and price setting?
1.3 technical change?
1.4 globalization and ¯nancial markets?
² How much security in:
2.1 base income?
2.2 employment?
2.3 location of employment?
2.4 atypical employment?
Moreover, in order to get social acceptance for such a combination of the interests of capital
owners and those of workers, basic aspects of social cohesion in a modern democratic market
economy must be given. Thus, the following problems must also ¯nd a positive solution:
² Is there a consent-based cooperation between capital and labor?
² Does a proper citizenship education and democratic evolution exist?
² Is the existence of equal opportunities assured?6
² Is there a re°ected and controlled evolution of institutions?
In this paper we will provide a model which reconciles the aspects 1.1/2 with the problems
2.1/2, where the other aspects of the enumerated points remain excluded. Further, we shall
simply assume that the societal issues in the last block have been developed to such an extent
that the proposed model is not only transparent to the citizens of the considered capitalist
society, but have indeed led to basic agreements on how the economy is to be organized and
how the society should be developed further.
2.3 Budget equations, consumption and investment
Against this background, we next design the accounting framework (formulate the budget
equations) of a growth model that combines ideas of Solow (1956) and Goodwin (1967). In
contrast to Goodwin, our model takes into account a second labor market which, through its
institutional setup, guarantees full employment in its interaction with the ¯rst labor market,
the highly °exible and competitive private sector of the economy. It goes without saying
that, to start with, the model must be formulated in as simple a way as possible, however,
incorporating the essential components which underlie a °exicurity economy and society. We
¯rst consider the sector of ¯rms in such an economy:
Firms
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This account is a very simple one. Firms use their capital stock K (at pro¯t-maximizing full
capacity utilization) to employ the amount of labor (in hours): Ld
1 in its operation, at the real
wage !1; the law of motion of which is to be determined in the next section from a model of the
wage-price dynamics in the private sector. They in addition employ labor force Lw
2f = ®fLd
1
(in heads4) from the second labor market at the wage !2; which is a constant fraction ®! of
the real wage in the ¯rst labor market. This labor force Lw
2f is working the normal hours
of a standard workday, while the workforce Lw
1 from the ¯rst labor market may be working
overtime or undertime depending on the size of the capital stock in particular. Therefore the
rate uw = Ld
1=Lw
1 gives the utilization rate of the workforce Lw
1 in the ¯rst labor market, the
private sector of the economy (all other employment comes from the working of households
4to be determined in the next section.7
occupied in the second labor market). Note ¯nally that the capital stock depreciates at the
rate ±:
Firms produce full capacity output, augmented by the company pension payments ±1R, out of
company pension funds R, to pensioners: Y +±1R = C1+C2+Cr+I+±K+G+S1, with S1¡±1R
giving the net in°ow into the company pension fund R (see also below). Output is sold to the
two types of consumers and the retired households, the investing ¯rms and the government.
The demand side of the model is formulated in a way such that this full capacity output can
be sold (see the supplement below), since investment is given by pro¯ts (and since all other
income is consumed or put into the company pension stock R in real terms). Deducting from
this output Y of ¯rms their real wage payments to workers in the ¯rst and the second labor
market (and depreciation) we get the pro¯ts ¦ of ¯rms which are assumed to be retained and
completely invested into capital stock growth _ K = I = ¦: Thus, we have Classical (direct)
investment habits but there is not yet debt or equity ¯nancing of investment in this model
type. We will assume (in place of the ¯xed proportions technology of Flaschel, Franke and
Semmler (2008) and Flaschel, Greiner, Luchtenberg and Nell (2008)) a neoclassical production
function as underlying the input-output data shown in the above table and we will describe
this in detail in the next section.
We next consider the household sector of our °exicurity model which is composed of worker
households working in the ¯rst labor market and the remaining ones (and pensioners) that are
all working in the second labor market.
Households I and II (primary and secondary labor market)
Income Account (Households I):
Uses Resources
C1 = ch1(1 ¡ ¿h)!1Ld
1
!2Lw


























Households of type I consume goods of amount C1 and simple labor services from the second
labor market Lw
2h: They pay an (in fact all) income taxes T and they pay in addition { via8
further tax transfers { all workers' income that is not coming from ¯rms, from them and the
government (which is equivalent to an unemployment insurance). Moreover, they pay the
pensions of the retired households (!2Lr) and accumulate their remaining income S1 in the
form of a company pension into a fund R that is administrated by ¯rms (with in°ow S1 and
out°ow ±1R). Thus, we have a pay-as-you-go pension system and a company pension fund
that assure the income of retired persons.




2g) can be considered as solidarity payments, since
workers from the ¯rst labor market that lose their job will automatically be employed in the
second labor market where full employment is guaranteed by the government. We consider
this employment as skill preserving, since it can be viewed as ordinary o±ce or handicraft work
(subject only to learning by doing when such workers return to the ¯rst labor market, i.e, to
employment in the production process of ¯rms).
The second sector of households is modelled in the simplest way that is available: Households




2g pay no taxes and totally
consume their income. We have thus Classical saving habits in this household sector, while
households of type I may have positive or negative savings S1 as residual from their income and
their expenditures. We assume that they can accumulate these savings (or dissave in case of a
negative S1) from the stock of commodities they have accumulated as pension fund inventories
in the past. In order to have a coherent distribution of the funds R that are accumulated by
households of type I on the basis of their savings S1; we have to formulate the law of motion
of such funds R as follows:
_ R = S1 ¡ ±1R
where ±1 is the rate by which these funds are depreciated through company pension payments
to the 'o±cially retired' workers Lr; assumed to be a constant fraction of the 'active' workforce
Lr = ®rL: These worker households are added here as not really inactive, but o®er work
according to their still existing capabilities that can be considered as a (voluntary) addition
to the supply of work organized by the government L ¡ (Lw
1 + Lw
2f + Lw
2h), i.e. the working
potential of the o±cially retired persons remains an active and valuable contribution of the
working hours that are supplied by the members of the society. We consider this principle
of `active aging' an important feature of a °exicurity economy. It is obvious that the proper
allocation of the work hours under the control of the government needs thorough re°ection
from the microeconomic and the social point of view, which however cannot be a topic in a
paper on the macroeconomics of such an economy.
As the income account of the retired households shows (see below) they receive pension pay-
ments as if they would work in the second labor market and they get in addition individual
transfer income (company pensions) from the accumulated funds R in proportion to the time
they have been active in the ¯rst labor market and as an aggregate household group of the
total amount ±1R by which the pension funds R are reduced in each period.9
Income Account (Retired Households):
Uses Resources
Cr !2Lr + ±1R;Lr = ®rL
Y r Y r
There is ¯nally the government sector which is also formulated in a very basic way:
The Government
Income Account: Fiscal Authority / Employer of First Resort
Uses Resources
G = ®gT T = ¿h!1Ld
1
!2Lw








Y g Y g
The government receives income taxes, the solidarity payments (employment bene¯ts) for the
second labor market paid from workers in the ¯rst labor market and old-age pension payments.
It uses the taxes to ¯nance government goods demand G and the surplus of taxes over these
government expenditures to actively employ the core workers in the government sector. In
addition it employs the workers receiving employment bene¯ts from the households in ¯rst
labor market and it in fact also employs the 'retired' persons to the extent they are willing
and can still contribute to the various employment activities. We thus have that the total
labor force in the second labor market is employed by ¯rms, by households of type I and the
remainder through the government as is obvious from the solidarity payments of households
working in the ¯rst labor market. The income payments to workers in the second labor
market (!2Lw
2 ) that are not originating from their services to ¯rms, to households of type I or
through an excess of income taxes over government commodity expenditures (base government
employment) are paid out of transfers from the household sector I that works in the private
sector to the government under competitive conditions. On the basis of these payments the
remaining work in the second labor market is organized by government (in the way it does this
in the administration of the state in all modern market economies).
In sum we get that workers are employed either in the ¯rst labor market and if not there
then by doing auxiliary work within ¯rms, services for households of type I or services in
the government sector concerning public administration, infrastructure services, educational
services or other public services. In addition there is a potential labor supply ®rL from the
retired households, which due to their long life-expectancy in modern societies can remain
e®ective suppliers of speci¯c work over a considerable span of their life time after their o±cial
retirement. In this way the whole workforce is always fully employed in this model of social
growth (and the retired persons according to their willingness and capabilities) and, thus, does
not su®er from human degradation through prolonged unemployment in particular. Of course,10
there are a variety of issues concerning state organized work that point to (incentive) problems
in the organization of such work, but all such problems exist also in actual industrialized
market economies in one way or another.
We have formulated in this section the skeleton of a °exicurity growth model of the economy
where full employment is not assumed, but actively constructed. The next sections augment the
accounts of the considered economy by basic behavioral relationships concerning production,
employment and the law of motion of real wages.
3 Smooth factor substitution, Okun's law and real wage rigidi-
ties
Our synthesis of the growth models of Solow (1956) and Goodwin (1967) into a model of the
°exicurity variety consists of three basic building blocks, the three factor production function
of the private sector, Okun's law that relates the utilization of the workforce Lw
1 to the hiring
and ¯ring decision of ¯rms and the dynamic of the real wages of the workers in the ¯rst labor
market, describing the degree of labor market rigidity existing in the private sector of the
economy.
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1 (2)
^ w1 = ¯w(uw ¡ 1) + ^ p; uw = Ld
1=Lw
1 (3)
The ¯rst (set of) equation(s) provide a three factor neoclassical production function, built on
standard assumptions, coupled with the conditions for pro¯t maximization with respect to its
two variable inputs, the labor hours worked by workers Lw
1 in the ¯rst labor market segment
and the normal working hours supplied by the workforce Lw
2f that is employed by ¯rms from
the second labor market. We stress that workers Lw
1 of type I are providing over- or under-time
work according to the needs of pro¯t-maximizing ¯rms (who will recruit additional workers or
dismiss employed ones in view of the discrepancy Ld
1 ¡Lw
1 described by Okun's law later on).5
We should also like to point out that there is one good in this economy that is produced with
two types of labor input supplied by households of type I and of type II, respectively.
The second equation describes, as already indicated, Okun's law in the given environment
where only Lw
1 is over- or under-employed (since capital is always fully employed and since we
have an employer of ¯rst resort with respect to the second labor market). The time rate of
change _ Lw
1 is following the excess measure Ld
1 ¡ Lw
1 with an adjustment speed described by
¯e, taking into account that the natural growth rate n; a constant, of the total workforce L
must be used as trend term in this law of motion to provide a steady state solution later on (if
further adjustment equations are to be avoided in this baseline model for reasons of simplicity).
5We assume that the normal supply of labor by individual workers is measure by `1' for notational simplicity.11
The third equation is a standard money-wage Phillips curve, solely based on the actual inside
employment of workers working on the ¯rst labor market, and on myopic perfect foresight
concerning price in°ation.6 This latter assumption avoids the explicit consideration of a price
Phillips curve, since we can then reduce the wage-price dynamics of this model type to a real
wage dynamics ^ !1;!1 = w1=p and need not consider nominal e®ects in the chosen framework.
For the real wage of workers in the second labor market we simply assume that it is a constant
fraction of the real wage !1; which means that income distribution is driven by the insiders
in the ¯rst labor market solely. Outsiders (the second labor market) play no role in the wage
bargaining process.
Since aggregate demand is always equal to aggregate supply in the chosen framework, since
all savings is product-oriented and since all pro¯ts are invested (i.e., Say's law holds), we have
that actual output can be and is supply driven, depending on the level of real wages !1;!2
and on the capital stock K:
Supplement: On the validity of Say's law in Solovian °exicurity growth.
In our social growth model, we have assumed that workers of type II consume their whole
income (they pay no taxes). With respect to the other type of workers we have assumed the
following consumption function
C1 = ch1(1 ¡ ¿h)!1Ld
1; ch propensity to consume;¿h tax rate
!2Lw
2h = ch2(1 ¡ ¿h)!1Ld
1 consumption of household services
Savings of households of type I is, on the basis of our accounting relationships, given by:
S1 = !1Ld
1 ¡ C1 ¡ !2Lw





due to the assumed solidarity contribution they provide to the second labor market.
Since the government, workers from the second labor market and pensioners do not save and
since all tax transfers are turned into consumption and the savings of households of type I into
commodity inventories of ¯rms from which company pensions are to be deducted and since
¯nally all pro¯ts are invested it can easily be shown that we must have at all times:
Y + ±1R = C1 + C2 + Cr + I + ±K + G + S1; C1 = ch1(1 ¡ ¿h)!1Ld
1;
if ¯rms produce at full capacity Y (which they can and will do in this case). Thus, there are
no demand problems on the market for goods and, therefore, no need to discuss a dynamic
multiplier process as in Keynesian type models. Note, moreover, that we have by construction








2 Lr = ®rL
6See Blanchard and Katz (1999) for its micro-foundation and note that we do not use Blanchard and Katz
(1999) error correction terms here which however { when added { would not modify our stability results obtained
in this paper.12
We have assumed that households of type I must pay a solidarity contribution (employment
bene¯ts) to those workers of type II, whose wages are not paid by ¯rms, through services of
households of type II to households of type I and through the core employment in the govern-
ment sector. The government employs in addition as administrative workers and infrastructure
workers (public work and education) the remaining workforce in the second labor market (plus
the Lr services from pensioners). This completes the discussion of the behavioral equations of
the social growth model.
4 Global convergence towards balanced reproduction
Normalizing level magnitudes by dividing through the capital stock K, as usual, and using
lower case letters for the ratios thereby obtained, we get the reduced form equations as:
y = F(1;ld
1;lw
2f); !1 = F2(1;ld
1;lw






1 ¡ 1) + n ¡ ^ K; ^ K = ½ = ¦=K (5)
^ !1 = ¯w(ld
1=lw
1 ¡ 1) (6)
Since !2 is a constant fraction of !1 we get from the pro¯t maximization condition of ¯rms




Assume that the production function F satis¯es:
F2 > 0; F3 > 0; F22 < 0; F33 < 0; F23 > = 0; ¢ = F22F33 ¡ (F23)2 > 0:








2f)0(!1) < 0 (8)
y = y(!1); y0(!1) < 0 (9)
½ = ½(!1); ½0(!1) < 0 (10)
Proof: See the mathematical appendix.
Given proposition 1, the dynamics implied by the model can be reduced to two nonlinear laws
of motion for the state variables !1;lw
1 > 0 of the type:
^ !1 = ¯w(ld
1(!1)=lw




1 ¡ 1) + n ¡ ½(!1) (12)





























The two di®erential equations (11) and (12) determine the dynamic behavior of our °exicurity
model. With these two equations we can prove the following two propositions.
Proposition 2:
Assume that there holds lim
!1!0
½(!1) = +1 and lim
!1!+1
½(!1) = 0: Then: The above
dynamical system has a unique interior steady state that is given by:
!o




Proof: See the mathematical appendix.
Proposition 3:
1. The above dynamical system can be reformulated as a planar system de¯ned on
the whole plane by using the logs $1;`w
1 > 0 of the state variables !1;lw
1 > 0 which
implies the equivalent system of di®erential equations
_ $1 = ¯w(exp(`d
1)(exp($1))=exp(`w




1 ) ¡ 1) + n ¡ ½(exp($1)) (15)
2. The unique interior steady state of these laws of motion is globally asymptotically
stable
Proof: An application of Olech's theorem (see the mathematical appendix)
Our model of social economic growth or °exicurity growth model always converges to its
unique balanced growth path. Just as the original Solow (1956) model it is based on supply
side conditions solely, while the demand side is only of importance for the savings decision
of households of type I and, therefore, for the evolution of company pension funds, to be
considered in detail in the next section.
Supplement: Solovian labor intensity l = L=K dynamics (solely an appended law
of motion under °exicurity growth):
By de¯nition we have the following further law of motion for labor intensity l in our model of
°exicurity growth.
^ l = n ¡ ½(!1)
For the Jacobian of the resulting 3D dynamics evaluated at the steady state we get from the
laws of motion for !1;lw
1 ;l:8














The above 3D dynamics are globally asymptotically stable, but exhibits zero root
hysteresis with respect to the state variable l:
Proof: See the mathematical appendix.
5 Monotonic adjustment processes through °exible hiring and
¯ring
We now derive a local condition for the occurrence of monotonic convergence to the steady
state of our model of °exicurity growth. According to the last proposition, we basically only
have to investigate the ¯rst two laws of motion. It su±ces therefore to consider the following















where the § sign reduces to + in the calculation of the determinant of this matrix. It is obvious
that we always have locally asymptotically stable dynamics (i.e. trace Jo < 0;detJo > 0).








separates monotonic convergence (for parameters ¯e su±ciently large) from cyclical conver-














Figure 1: The case of a small parameter ¯e15
This gives:
Proposition 5:












Then, there exists a unique bifurcation value ¯H
e > 0 that separates monotonic from
cyclical convergence. Cyclical convergence to the balanced growth path occurs for
all ¯e 2 (0;¯H
e ); and monotonic convergence to the balanced growth path occurs for
all ¯e 2 (¯H
e ;+1):
Proof: See the mathematical appendix.
The case of monotonic convergence is shown in ¯gure 2, while the case of cyclical convergence to
the steady state is given in ¯gure 1. Thus, we get that economic °uctuations can be avoided in
this type of economy if wages in the ¯rst labor market respond relatively sluggishly to demand
pressure in this market (as measured by the utilization rate of the insiders) and if hiring and
¯ring is a su±ciently °exible process as envisaged by the concept of °exicurity capitalism. The
critical value for the hiring and ¯ring speed parameter in our model of social growth is the
larger, the larger the reaction of money wage in°ation with respect to workforce utilization,
i.e. the larger the parameter ¯w becomes.
Figure 2: The case of a large parameter ¯e
6 A further law of motion: Company pension funds
There is a further law of motion in the background of the model that needs to be considered in
order to provide an additional statement on the viability of the considered model of °exicurity16
capitalism. This law of motion describes the evolution of the pension fund per unit of the
capital stock ´ = R
K and is obtained from the de¯ning equation _ R = S1 ¡ ±1R as follows:












¡ (±1 + ½)´ = s1 ¡ (±1 + ½)´
For reasons of simplicity we now assume a Cobb-Douglas production function. Then, we know
that there is a constant ®f > 0 such that lw
2f = ®fld
1 holds. Savings of households of type I
and pro¯ts of ¯rms per unit of capital are given by:









lr = ®rl; i:e: due to the ¯nancing of the employment terms lw
2h + lw
2g :
s1 = (1 ¡ ch1(1 ¡ ¿h) ¡ ®g¿h)!1ld





½ = y ¡ (1 + ®!®f)!1ld
1(!1)] ¡ ±
For reasons of analytical simplicity we also assume that the economy has already reached
its steady state with respect to the variables !1;lw
1 and that we also have a given ratio l =
L=K = const. This is a simplifying assumption that must be accompanied later on by the
assumption that the actual value of l = ¹ l must be chosen in a neighborhood of a base value
lo (see below). The above of course also provides us with a steady state value for the rate of
pro¯t ¹ ½(¹ !1) = ½o(!o): Moreover we also assume for simplicity ±1 = ± for the depreciation rates
of the capital stock and for the stock of pension funds.
This gives for the law of motion of the pension fund per unit of capital the following di®erential
equation:
_ ´ = (1 ¡ ch1(1 ¡ ¿h) ¡ ®g¿h)¹ !1ld
1(¹ !1) ¡ ((1 + ®r)¹ l ¡ (¹ lw
1 + ®fld
1(¹ !1)))®!¹ !1 ¡ (± + ¹ ½)´
which gives a single linear di®erential equation for the ratio ´: This dynamical equation is
globally asymptotically stable around its steady state position given by:
´o =
(1 ¡ ch1(1 ¡ ¿h) ¡ ®g¿h)¹ !1ld
1(¹ !1) ¡ ((1 + ®r)¹ l ¡ (1 + ®f)ld
1(¹ !1))®!¹ !1
± + ¹ ½
In this case we have monotonic adjustment of the pension-fund capital ratio to its steady state
position, while in general we have a non-autonomous adjustment of this ratio that is driven by
the real wage and employment dynamics of the ¯rst labor market. The steady state level of ´
is positive i® there holds for the full employment labor intensity ratio:
¹ l <
(1 ¡ ch1(1 ¡ ¿h) ¡ ®g¿h)¹ !1ld
1(¹ !1) + ((1 + ®f)ld
1(¹ !1))®!¹ !1
(± + ¹ ½)(1 + ®r)®!¹ !1
We assume in addition that the additional company pension payments to pensioners should
add the percentage 100®c to their base pension !2®r¹ l per unit of capital. This gives as a
further restriction for the steady state position of the economy:
±´o = ®c!2®r¹ l; !2 = ®!¹ !117
Inserting the value for ´o then gives
®c = ±
(1 ¡ ch1(1 ¡ ¿h) ¡ ®g¿h)¹ !1ld
1(¹ !1) ¡ ((1 + ®r)¹ l ¡ (1 + ®f)ld
1(¹ !1))®!¹ !1
(± + ¹ ½)!2®r¹ l
In this way, we get that a target value for ®c demands a certain labor intensity ratio ¹ l and vice
versa. For a given total labor intensity ratio there is a given percentage by which company
pensions compare to base pension payments. This percentage is the larger the smaller the ratio
¹ lw
1 =¹ l due to the following reformulation of the ®c formula:
®c = ±
[(1 ¡ ch1(1 ¡ ¿h) ¡ ®g¿h)¹ !1 + (1 + ®f)®!¹ !1]¹ lw
1 =¹ l ¡ (1 + ®r)®!¹ !1
(± + ¹ ½)®r®!¹ !1
(16)
If this value of the total employment labor intensity ratio prevails in the considered economy
(where it is of course as usually assumed that ch1(1¡¿h)+®g¿h < 1 holds) we have that core
pension payments to pensioners are augmented by company pension payments by a percentage
that is given by the parameter ®c and that these extra pension payments are distributed to
pensioners in proportion to the time that they have worked in the private sector of the economy.
This implies a trade-o® between the ratios ¹ l;®c; as expressed by the relationship (16). It also
shows that the total working population must make a certain ratio of the capital stock in order
to allow for a given percentage of extra company pension payments.
Due to ±´o = ®c!2®r¹ l and so
1 = (±+ ¹ ½)´o we also have the equivalence between positive savings
per unit of capital of households of type I and positive values for ®c;´o: Moreover, these values
are indeed positive if the following holds:9
¹ l <
(1 ¡ ch1(1 ¡ ¿h) ¡ ®g¿h)¹ !1ld
1(¹ !1) + (1 + ®f)ld
1(¹ !1))®!¹ !1
(± + ¹ ½)(1 + ®r)®!¹ !1
This inequality set limits to the total labor-supply capital-stock ratio ¹ l which allows for positive
savings of households of type I in the steady state and thus for extra pension payments to them
later on. Households of type I are by and large ¯nancing the second labor market through
taxes and employment bene¯ts (besides their contribution to the base income of the retired
people). Since ¯rms have a positive rate of pro¯t in the steady state, since the government
budget is always balanced and since only households of type I save in this economy, we have
derived the condition under which such an economy accumulates not only capital, but also
pensions funds to a su±cient degree { under appropriate restrictions on labor supply.
7 Conclusion and outlook
We have shown in this paper that a model of °exicurity capitalism can be formulated, exhibit-
ing a second labor market (and an employer of ¯rst resort) where all workers not employed
by private ¯rms ¯nd meaningful employment. This economy is characterized by viable and
attracting balanced reproduction schemes. Hence, we have been able to demonstrate that a
9Note that the numerator is easily shown to be positive and even larger than 1 under standard Keynesian
assumptions on expenditure and taxation rates.18
capitalistic system which is characterized by both °exibility and social security is a stable and,
thus, sustainable system. Social security in our model means that retired workers get pensions
from a pay-as-you-go system and from ¯rms that administer a pension fund that is built up
through savings of active workers. In addition, workers not employed by ¯rms receive soli-
darity payments and meaningful occupation from the government. This shows that our social
security system is rather complex but, nevertheless, allows convergence to a steady state. In
case of a su±ciently °exible labor market the convergence is even monotonic implying that
transitory business cycle °uctuations can be avoided.
In technical terms, the model exhibits a unique interior steady state which is globally asymp-
totically stable. We could show this by concentrating on the private sector of the economy,
the dynamics of which are characterized by insider real wage adjustment dynamics of the type
considered in Blanchard and Katz (1999),10 and on a type of Okun's Law that linked the level
of utilization of the insiders of ¯rms to their hiring and ¯ring decision. Since both of these laws
of motion only refer to the ¯rst labor market and, thus, only to a part of the whole workforce,
the fundamental equation of the Solow (1956) growth model has appeared only as an appendix
to this core dynamics, describing the evolution of the total labor supply per unit of capital in
addition.
A further fundamental law concerning the viability of the economy was the law of motion of
company pension funds per unit of capital which was shown to lead to a viable steady state
level of it when the labor-supply capital ratio is bounded by above in an appropriate way. The
existence of such pension funds allows in principle to add credit (out of these funds) to the
considered °exicurity model which, when such credits are delivered in physical form, would
not question the supply side orientation of the model, see Flaschel, Greiner, Luchtenberg and
Nell (2008) for details.
This, however, changes when paper credit is added to the model implying that investment
demand can now depart from the supply of savings in which case we get an IS-equilibrium on
the market for goods that generally di®ers from the supply of goods through pro¯t-maximizing
¯rms. In place of savings-driven supply side °uctuations in economic activity we then have
investment driven demand side business cycle °uctuations of a probably much more volatile
type. This situation is modeled and analyzed in Flaschel et al. (2008). It represents one litmus
test for the proper working of °exicurity capitalism, since supply side growth may be too stable
a situation in order to really test the strength of economies that are designed on the basis of the
°exicurity approach. In such a situation it has to be tested in detail, also numerically (since the
resulting 5D dynamics are of a fully interdependent type), how the hiring and ¯ring parameter
¯e in°uences the performance of the economy. In addition, prudent ¯scal and monetary policy
may then be needed in order to preserve the stability features we have shown to exist for our
supply side version of °exicurity growth in this paper. The investigation of such topics must
be left for future research here however.
10if myopic perfect foresight is added to their discussion of a wage Phillips curve and its theoretical under-
pinnings.19
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Mathematical Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Since !2 is a constant fraction of !1; we set !2 = ®!1; where ® is a positive constant. We can
express then the rate of pro¯t ½ as follows:







The ¯rst order conditions for the maximization of ½ with respect to ld
1 and lw
2f are given by








2f) ¡ ®!1 = 0 (A3)
where F2 = @F=@ld
1 and F3 = @F=@lw
2f: The second order conditions for the maximization of ½
can be written as follows:







= F22F33 ¡ (F23)2 > 0 (A4)
where F22 = @2F=@ld2
1 ; F33 = @2F=@lw2






F2 > 0; F3 > 0; F22 < 0; F33 < 0; F23 > = 0; ¢ = F22F33 ¡ (F23)2 > 0:
Remark A1.
Suppose that the production function is of the Cobb-Douglas type such that
Y = AK1¡¯1¡¯2(Ld
1)¯1(Lw




2f)¯2; y = Y=K:
In this case, all of the inequalities in Assumption 1 are satis¯ed (and F23 > 0):
Proposition 1
All of the relationships (7) { (10) in the text are satis¯ed under Assumption A1.

























































Therefore, we have y = F(1;ld
1(!1);lw
2f(!1)) = y(!1) and











It follows from eq. (A1) that ½ is a linear decreasing function of !1 for any given values of
ld
1 > 0 and lw
2f > 0: Therefore, the graph of the function ½ = ½(!1) becomes the outer envelope
of downward sloping straight lines. This means that we have ½0(!1) = d½=d!1 < 0:
Next, let us consider the phase diagram for the system (11), (12) in the text (see there ¯gure













0(!1) < 0 (A10)
The locus of _ lW
1 = 0 is given by
fld
1(!1)=lw
1 ¡ 1g + fn ¡ ½(!1)g=¯e = 0 (A11)




















































In other words, the slope of the locus of _ lw
1 = 0 is positive for all su±ciently small values of ¯e,
and it is negative for all su±ciently large values of ¯e, and the locus of _ lw
1 = 0 coincides with
that of _ !1 = 0 if ¯e is in¯nitely large. On the other hand, we can easily see that @^ !1=@!1 < 0
and @^ lw
1 =@lw
1 < 0: Therefore, we obtain two types of the phase diagrams (see the ¯gures 1 and23
2 in the text) depending on the magnitude of the parameter value ¯e:








The Assumption B1 is in fact satis¯ed if the production function is of Cobb-Douglas type.
Proposition 2
The two-dimensional dynamical system that is described by equations (11) and (12) has a
unique interior steady state that is given by Eq. (13) in the text.
Proof: The equilibrium solution of this dynamical system is characterized by the following





½(!1) = n (B2)
Eq. (B2) has the unique solution !o
1 = ½¡1(n) > 0 because of Assumption B2 and the fact
that the function ½(!1) is a decreasing function. Substituting !1 = !o





C. Proof of Proposition 3
Let us de¯ne





We can then transform the dynamical system that is given by equations (11) and (12) in the
text as follows:
_ ~ !1 = ¯wfexp(~ ld
1)(exp(~ !1))=exp(~ lw
1 ) ¡ 1g = G1(~ !1;~ lw
1 ) (C2)
_ ~ lw
1 = ¯efexp(~ ld
1)(exp(~ !1))=exp(~ lw
1 ) ¡ 1g + n ¡ ½(exp(~ !1)) = G2(~ !1;~ lw
1 ) (C3)
This system is well-de¯ned for all (~ !;~ lw







where G11 = @G1













1 )g < 0; G21 =
@G2












1 )g < 0 for all (~ !1;~ lw
1 ) 2
R2:24
Therefore, we have the following set of inequalities for all (~ !1;~ lw











G11G22 6= 0 (C7)
This set of inequalities implies that all of Olech's su±cient conditions for global asymptotic
stability of the two-dimensional system of di®erential equations are satis¯ed (cf. Gandolfo,
1996, 354 { 355). This proves all assertions of Proposition 3.11
D. Proof of Proposition 4
Let us consider the global stability of the system of dynamical equations (11) and (12) in the
text when appended by the following law of motion for l:
^ l = n ¡ ½(!1) (D1)
This system is a decomposable system, and we already know that the unique equilibrium
point (!o
1;lwo
1 ) of the independent subsystem that consists of equations (11) and (12) is
globally stable (cf. Proposition 3). In other words, we have lim
t!+1
!1(t) = !o




1) = n (cf. Proposition 2). Therefore, we obtain
lim
t!+1
^ l(t) = n ¡ lim
t!+1
½(!1(t)) = n ¡ n = 0: (D2)
This means that the whole system is globally stable in the sense that l also converges to some
value although lim
t!+1
l(t) depends on the initial condition l(0): We can prove the dependency
of lim
t!+1
l(t) on l(0) as follows. Let us de¯ne ~ l = lnl: Then, we can rewrite eq. (D1) as
_ ~ l = n ¡ ½(!1): (D3)
Integrating this equation with respect to time, we obtain
~ l(t) = ~ l(0) +
R t
0 fn ¡ ½(!1(¿)gd¿ (D4)
so that we have
lim
t!+1
~ l(t) = ~ l(0) +
R 1
0 fn ¡ ½(!1(¿)gd¿: (D5)
This proves the assertion.
E. Proof of Proposition 5
We can rewrite the system of dynamical equations (11) and (12) in the text as follows:
_ !1 = !1¯wfld
1(!1)=lw






1 ¡ 1g + n ¡ ½(!1)] = ~ G2(!1;lw
1 ) (E2)
11See also Flaschel (1984) for the application of Olech's theorem in the context of models of economic growth.25
The Jacobian matrix of this system at the equilibrium point (!o
1;lwo


































Then, the characteristic equation of this system becomes
¡o(¸) = j¸I ¡ Joj = ¸2 + a1¸ + a2 = 0 (E4)
where








1 > 0; (E5)









1 > 0: (E6)
The discriminant(D) of this system can be written as
D = a2
1 ¡ 4a2 = D(¯e): (E7)
It is now obvious that cyclical °uctuations around the equilibrium point occur if and only if
D < 0 holds true.
Assumption E1













Under Assumption E1, we get for the uniquely determined bifurcation value that separates
monotonic from cyclical convergence the inequality ¯H
e > 0. Cyclical convergence to the
balanced growth path occurs for all ¯e 2 (0;¯H
e ); and monotonic convergence to the balanced
growth path occurs for all ¯e 2 (¯H
e ;+1):
Proof: We can easily see that D(¯e) is a monotonically increasing continuous function of ¯e
with the following properties.
lim
¯e!+1










Assumption E1 implies that D(0) < 0: In this case, there exists unique positive value ¯H
e
such that we have D(¯H
e ) = 0; D(¯e) < 0 for all ¯e 2 (0;¯H
e ); and D(¯e) > 0 for all
¯e 2 (¯H
e ;+1): This proves the assertion because we already proved the global convergence
of the solution to the balanced growth path(cf. Proposition 3) 
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